With the prosperity of smart contracts and the blockchain technology, various security analyzers have been proposed from both the academia and industry to address the associated risks. Yet, there does not exist a high-quality benchmark of smart contract vulnerability for security research. In this study, we propose an approach towards building a high-quality vulnerability benchmark. Our approach consists of two parts. First, to improve recall, we propose to search for similar vulnerabilities in an automated way by leveraging the abstract vulnerability signature (AVS). Second, to remove the false positives (FPs) due to AVS-based matching, we summarize the detection rules of existing tools and apply the refined rules by considering various defense mechanisms (DMs). By integrating AVS-based code matching and the refined detection rules (RDR), our approach achieves higher precision and recall. On the collected 76,354 contracts, we build a benchmark consisting of 1,219 vulnerabilities covering five different vulnerability types identified together by our tool (DOUBLADE) and other three scanners. Additionally, we conduct a comparison between DOUBLADE and the others, on an additional 17,770 contracts. Results show that DOUBLADE can yield a better detection accuracy with similar execution time.
Introduction
Powered by the blockchain technique [8] , smart contract [36] has attracted plenty of attention and have been applied in various industries, e.g., financial service, supply chains, smart traffic, and IoTs. Among the languages for the smart contract, Solidity is now the first choice, owing to its popularity and simplicity. However, in versions before Solidity 0.5.0, little security consideration is presented in its language tool chains [43] . Besides loose security checks, some special features of Solidity (e.g., fallback functions) also exacerbate this problem,making smart contracts prone to errors and vulnerabilities. The public has witnessed several severe security incidents, including the notorious DAO attack [49] and Parity wallet hack [39] . According to the previous reports [5, 7] , up to 16 types of security vulnerabilities were found in Solidity programs. These security issues undermine the confidence people have in executing transactions via smart contracts and eventually affect the trusts towards the blockchain ecosystem.
Witnessing the severity and urgency of this problem, researchers and security practitioners have made endeavors to develop automated security scanners. According to our survey, there exist at least 13 scanners, most of which adopt the rule-based or verification-based methods for vulnerability detection. SLITHER [47] and OYENTE [33] are among the most popular open-source analysis tools that are publicly available. Besides, there are also several recently published security tools such as ZEUS [25] , SMARTCHECK [44] , SE-CURIFY [48] , etc. Each of them has its own advantages and limitations, covering various vulnerability types. Notably, the term vulnerability in this study refers to the security issues exploitable by external attackers, not including unexploitable style issues and code smells (e.g., bad naming conventions in SLITHER and unspecified version issue in SMARTCHECK).
Although various scanners are available, to the best of our knowledge, there still does not exist a high-quality benchmark for vulnerable smart contracts yet. Building such a benchmark is a non-trivial task, as the real-world scanners may be neither sound nor complete. The reasons come from twofold. First, the detection rules may be out-of-date. As developers become aware of possible vulnerabilities and the corresponding attacks, they often add some defense mechanisms (DMs) in code for the purpose of prevention (see examples in §6.2). However, most of the existing scanners fail to consider DMs in code, causing FPs. Second, programs on Ethereum may be logically similar. Hence, code cloning [41] also widely exists across smart contracts [35] (see examples in Fig. 1 and Fig. 10 ). Still, the existing scanners ignore the cloning phenomenon, causing FNs. Hence, purely relying on existing scanners to build a high-quality benchmark is problematic.
To further support the argument that code cloning widely exists in smart contracts, we conduct a textual-similarity anal- ysis on our collected 76,354 contracts from 18,714 accounts in Ethereum. We compile the contracts from the same account by alphabetical order of contract name into a textual file, and apply the well-known clone detection tool CCFINDER [26] to find their pairwise textual similarity. Surprisingly, as shown in Fig. 1 , we find that at least 47.9% files hold a ≥ 60% similarity with some other file. Especially, 8.6% account files are exactly the same. The reason is twofold: 1) the logic behind Solidity programs could be generally similar; 2) new developers may browse and copy existing contracts' code. Hence, as VUDDY [27] is effectively applied for identifying similar buggy code via matching code signatures for C language, it is desirable to have a tool of using the known bug signatures to find more similar unknown bugs in smart contracts. However, we find that none of the existing tools take into account code similarity matching.
The code-similarity based buggy code search helps provide more bug candidates and therefore improves the recall. Meanwhile, the similarity-based code search may bring many false positives (FPs), owing to the observation that the fixed code with DMs is often syntactically similar to the original vulnerable code. Hence, during the process of similarity-based code search, it is inevitable to retrieve many clones of safe code with DMs, and they should be eliminated from the detection results via some automated approach.
In this paper, we present a two-phase approach for building the benchmark. The basic idea is shown in Fig. 2 . First, we use true positives (TPs) reported by the existing scanners as abstract vulnerability signature (AVS), and apply (AVS)-based code matching to automatically discover more candidates unknown to the existing scanners -this step is to improve the recall for building the vulnerability benchmark. Second, to eliminate the code clones that are actually non-vulnerable with DMs, manual inspection is conducted to summarize those DMs in code, based on which the refined detection rules (RDR) are summarized and applied to improve the precision for the enlarged vulnerability benchmark. By integrating AVS and RDR, we manage to build the vulnerability benchmark of good precision and recall, with a high extent of automation and acceptable manual efforts.
Technically, the AVS matching step consists of three steps ( §3). First, we choose three of the existing scanners to find some concrete vulnerable samples and remove the FPs via manual inspection ( §4.2). Second, we employ the clustering algorithm to group the similar vulnerable samples of the same type and then extract AVS via code differencing algorithm ( §5.1). Third, we leverage the AVS to automatically search for more concrete vulnerable samples via similar code matching technique ( §5.2). The technical novelty lies in the proposal of AVS and AVS-based code matching algorithm to help discover the similar vulnerabilities that could contain small or big code gaps ( §2). Note that AVS extraction is performed on the clustering and differencing results.
For the RDR part, the major workload is to survey the existing scanners and understand their internal detection rules. It is inevitable to have some extent of manual inspection. Hence, we build a team of four research staff, and three of them have industrial working or internship experiences. After two weeks' training, the team started to utilize the existing scanners. Starting with all open-sources scanners, we finally chose SLITHER, OYENTE and SMARTCHECK (see details in §4.1). The team spent in total five months on reading the documentation and source code of the existing scanners, and auditing the results to summarize the rules of scanners and the DMs in code that cause FPs -finally formulate the RDR. The formulation of RDR is an iterative process with the aid of AVS and the existing scanners, as they all provide FPs with DMs to fix the vulnerability in code (see details in §6.4).
To summarize, we make the following contributions: 1. We improve the detection recall, we propose a similarcode matching algorithm on the basis of the AVS, which helps to detect similar vulnerabilities containing big or small gaps, given some existing known vulnerabilities.
2. We improve the detection precision, we propose to investigate the three state-of-the-art scanners and summarize their rules (if not documented To the best of our knowledge, we make the first attempt to summarize and apply the DMs that are unconsidered by the existing scanners, and applying the similarity-based code match for detection. Besides, vulnerability detection and benchmark construction involve more than 90,000 contracts. 
Background
In this section, we explain the five vulnerability types targeted by our study. We show two real cases, which are not wellhandled by the state-of-the-art scanners, to motivate our study.
Vulnerability Types
Early in 2016, Atzei et al. [7] have observed 6 types of vulnerabilities that could exist in smart contracts. Recently, on a public technical blog [5] , a more detailed taxonomy for vulnerabilities in Solidity code is summarized, accompanied by preventative techniques (similar to DMs in this study) and real-world examples. We list the five major vulnerability types from the top-10 vulnerability types according to [15, 34] .
1.
Reentrancy. As the most famous Ethereum vulnerability, reentrancy recursively triggers the fall-back function 1 to steal money from the victim's balance or deplete the gas of the victim. Reentrancy occurs when external callers manage to invoke the callee contract before the execution of the original call is finished, and it was mostly caused by the improper usages of the function withdraw() and call.value(amount)(). It was also reported in [7] . 2. The Abuse of tx.origin. When the visibility is improperly set for some key functions (e.g., some sensitive functions with public modifier), the extra permission control then matters. However, issues can arise when contracts use the deprecated tx.origin (especially, tx.origin==owner) to validate callers for permission control. It is relevant to the access control vulnerability in [34] . 3. Unchecked Low-level-call. In Solidity, users can use low level functions call(), callcode(), delegatecall() and send(). They are different from other Solidity functions, as they will not throw exception or exit when encountering errors. Instead, they continue to run and return a boolean value false. Gasless send, one of the six vulnerability types listed by [7] , is related to this vulnerability. 1 Fall-back function is a special function in Solidity, which has no function names, parameters, and return values. It will be triggered when the function signature does not match any of the available functions in a contract. 4 . Unexpected Revert. In a smart contract, if some operations unfortunately fail, the whole transaction will revert. So the attacker could deliberately make some operations fail for the purpose of denial of service (DoS). This is also termed DoS with revert in [15] . 5. Self-destruct Abusing. This vulnerability allows the attackers to forcibly send Ether without triggering its fall-back function. Normally, the contracts place important logic in the fall-back function or making calculations based on a contract's balance. However, this could be bypassed via the self-destruct contract method that allows a user to specify a beneficiary to send any excess ether [15] .
Scope of Our Study. According to [15, 34] , there are other vulnerability types: Time Manipulation (type 6), Arithmetic Issues (type 7), Bad Randomness (type 8), Front-Running (type 9), and Short Address (type 10). In this paper, we focus on the types of severe vulnerabilities that are not well-supported by the existing scanners. After some preliminary study, we find type 7, 8, 10 are relatively easy to detect by simple rules of the existing scanners. For example, as long as unsigned integers are used for arithmetic operations, there exist arithmetic issues. When keccak256 or block.blockhash are used for assignment, bad randomness happens. If the input address is less than 20-byte, it leads to short address. Basically, these rules have no FPs or FNs. Besides, type 9 (front-running) is quite difficult to prevent, as it requires the understanding of business logic inside a specific contract; type 6 is more like a theoretic threat due to bad coding style. Thus, we target at the first 5 types in this paper, as they are not well-supported by existing scanners.
Example One -The Need for AVS
Similar code blocks (CBs) with small gaps (e.g., CBs in Fig. 10 ) are well detected by clone detectors (e.g., CCFINDER [26] DECKARD [24] and NICAD [42] based on editing distance) in software engineering community. In reality, there exist many similar vulnerable CBs that just follow common code patterns but differ greatly in concrete logicwe refer to them as similar vulnerable code with big gaps. Figure 4 : CB3: a real case of using a self-defined modifier (DM3), a FP of reentrancy for SLITHER and OYENTE. We use ** ** to highlight the self-defined modifier. At first glance, CB1 and CB2 in Fig. 3 are quite different, as their gaps (omitted statements) significantly outnumber their common statements. These two CBs can not usually be detected by mainstream clone detectors such as CCFINDER [26] and DECKARD [24] -their total similarity is lower than the often used similarity threshold (e.g., 70%). However, both of them are vulnerable and essentially similar. For CB1 in Fig. 3a , an attacker can reassign the leader address and make any refund to the address always fail. By calling the bid() function, the attacker can exclusively occupy the leader forever and achieve the goal of DoS. Similarly, CB2 in Fig. 3b is also problematic, the attacker could exploit it with the code shown in Fig. 16 . When highestBidder.transfer(fundsByBidder[highestBidder]) is executed, the fallback function of the attacker will be triggered and the revert will happen.
Interestingly, most of the existing scanners have no rules for this. We propose the following rule to detect this vulnerability: dcl(adr g ) ∨ dcl(var) adr g .trans f er(var) (adr g = msg.sender) ⇒ unexpected revert (1) where dcl(adr g ) denotes the declaration of a public address, denotes the execution time order in the control flow, adr g .trans f er(var) calls function trans f er() of that address, and adr g = msg.sender reassigns the address of msg.sender to adr g . This rule helps to detect some vulnerable samples but it is incomplete to cover all other similar ones (e.g., changing trans f er() to other functions for money transfer). To sum up, Fig. 3 motivates the AVS design that detects similar vulnerable CBs with an excellent recall and acceptable precision, regardless of small or big gaps across them.
Example Two -The Need of RDR
In Fig. 4 , we can see an FP of reentrancy reported by SLITHER and OYENTE. SLITHER adopts Rule 2 to detect reentrancy. r(var g )∨w(var g ) externCall w(var g ) ⇒ reentrancy (2) where r() and w() denote the write and read operations, respectively; var g denotes a certain public global variable; denotes the execution time order in the control flow; externCall denotes the external call to the money-transfer functions except built-in functions send() and transfer(). In short, this rule is to check: if there exists an external call to a moneytransfer function (***.value(_value)(_storKey)) and the call is between the read and write operations to a state variable (registered), a reentrancy may happen.
Similarly, CB3 is reported by OYENTE as vulnerable, according to its run-time detection Rule 3 below:
where gas trans > 2300 means the gas for transaction must be larger than 2300, amt bal > amt trans means the balance amount must be larger than transfer amount, and lastly the public variable could be changed before external calls. However, CB3 actually takes into account the security issue and adds the self-defined modifier onlyAdmin() before the possibly vulnerable function regstDocs. As onlyAdmin() restricts that a transaction can only be done by the admin or owner roles, otherwise the transactions will be reverted. In such a way, regstDocs cannot be recursively called by external attackers.
Clearly, as the defense mechanism (DM) just adds a small delta (e.g., onlyAdmin() at line 10), the AVS-based code matching will report the CBs with or without the modifier as vulnerability candidates. In such cases, some proper post-processing is required after the AVS-based matching, which indicates that the DM-based RDR plays a vital role in achieving high precision when both vulnerable and safe code patterns exist. In reality, various DMs need to be considered to remove FPs from results of the existing scanners (see §4.2).
System Overview
Basically, our approach consists of three steps: 1. Selecting the existing scanners: this step is to find some concrete vulnerabilities to serve as the input for AVS learning, and hence our whole approach starts with the detection results of the existing scanners (see §4.1). 2. Learning and Applying AVS: first, we adopt a clustering algorithm to group the similar vulnerabilities of the same type and then extract the AVS via code differencing algorithm (see §5.1); then, on the basis of code matching technique (i.e., Algorithm 1 in §5.2.2), we leverage the AVS to search for more concrete vulnerabilities (see §5.2). 3. Summarizing and Applying RDR: during the manual auditing of the detection results (especially those FPs) of the existing scanners, we inspect their detection rules and observe the DMs in code that cause FPs. Hence, we can refine existing good detection rules by considering DMsthat is to conclude the RDR based on DMs (see §4.2).
As shown in Fig. 15 (see Appendix due to space limit), the input of our approach to build benchmark just includes the set of unlabeled (unknown for vulnerability) smart contract and several existing scanners, while the output consists of a set of vulnerable smart contracts, the leaned AVS and the summarized RDR. Notably, the final AVS and RDR can be combined as a framework to detect the unknown vulnerability on a new dataset.
Investigating Tools and Summarizing RDR
In §4, we explain how to choose the existing scanners and how to observe the DMs from results of these tools.
Choosing Scanners
Tool Survey. We investigated 13 existing tools (see Table 8 in Appendix). Some tools were not included in the current study for various reasons. ZEUS is not open-sourced, and hence we could not include it. ECHIDNA is a fuzzing library and it requires user-defined drivers to enable vulnerability detection. Similarly, OCTOPUS is an EVM bytecode decompiling and analysis tool rather than an automated detection tool. Besides, we also tried to use MYTHRIL and MYTHX (the Web version of MYTHRIL), but MYTHRIL does not compile successfully and the service of MYTHX is not under maintenance. 2 CON-TRACTFUZZER needs to run on a private blockchain and makes modifications to the EVM. Also as a dynamic fuzzing tool, CONTRACTFUZZER cannot scale up to a large dataset. Choice of Scanners. In Table 9 in Appendix, we list the remaining five scanners after the initial trial and show the detection capabilities of each one. For MANTICORE, we find that it has some performance issues when applied to perform a large-scale detection. 3 Finally, we choose SLITHER, OYENTE and SMARTCHECK to collect the concrete vulnerabilities for AVS extraction and RDR summarization. SECURIFY, representing the state-of-the-art [48] , was not chosen when we summarized the DMs of the existing scanners, since at that time SECURIFY was not open-sourced yet. However, we include SECURIFY in the tool comparison at a later time to evaluate our final tool DOUBLADE (see §6.2).
Collecting Concrete Vulnerabilities and Summarizing RDR considering DMs
We applied the three chosen scanners to 76,354 contracts. Overall, SLITHER reports the most vulnerabilities, in total 1244 candidates covering five types. In contrast, SMARTCHECK reports 1,035 candidates and OYENTE reports only 108 candidates. However, due to the internal detection 2 We tried to contact the developers of MYTHRIL via emails and inquiring on GitHub issues. However, we have not received any reply. 3 We seek for help on GitHub issues, and one of the MANTICORE developers suggested us to switch to SLITHER. mechanisms, each scanner inevitably yields some FPs. We show some representative FP patterns below to illustrate how the existing scanners are ignorant of the possible DMs. FPs of Reentrancy. As the reentrancy caused some significant losses in the past [49] , newly deployed contracts on Ethereum have already adopted some DMs to prevent from exploits of the reentrancy. We summarize the five main types of DMs for reentrancy: DM1. access control by identity check with owner; DM2. payment protection by hard-coding the address of payee or payer; DM3. payment protection by private or the self-predefined function modifier; DM4. payment protection by execution lock(s); DM5. state or balance updating before sensitive payment. However, these DMs are seldomly considered by the existing scanners, resulting in the high FP rate of detection.
DM1 adds various forms of checks (i.e., in require or assert or if) for msg.sender. For example, DM1 checks whether the identity of msg.sender satisfies certain conditions (e.g., equal to the owner, or with a good reputation, or having the dealing history) before calling the external payment functions.
For DM2, in Fig. 5 , according to Rule 2, CB4 is reported as a reentrancy by SLITHER-firstly, it reads the public variable agets[_idx]; then calls external function bancorToken.transfer(); last, writes to the public variable agets[_idx]. However, in practice, reentrancy will never be triggered by external attackers due to the hard-coded address constant (0x1F...FF1C) at line 3 in Fig. 5 .
For DM3 of adopting user-defined modifiers for protection, we find some interesting cases that are falsely reported by existing scanners. For example, in Fig. 4 , CB3 actually takes into account the security issue and adds the self-defined modifier onlyAdmin() before the possibly vulnerable function regstDocs. Since onlyAdmin() restricts that the transaction can be only done by the admin or owner role, otherwise the transactions will be reverted. In such a way, regstDocs could not be recursively called by external attackers. Notably, for CB3 in Fig. 4 , if we changed function modifier regstDocs from onlyAdmin to internal at line 10, SLITHER and OYENTE would still report it as a reentrancy vulnerability -but it cannot be called by external attackers, as it is not called in any public function.
DM4 is to prevent from the recursive entrance of the function -eliminating the issue from root. For instance, in Fig. 6 , the internal instance variable reEntered will be checked at line 5 before processing the business logic between line 8 and 10 of CB5. To prevent the reentering due to calling ZTHTKN.buyAndSetDivPercentage.value(), reEntered will be switched to true; after the transaction is done, it will be reverted to false to allow other transactions. According to [15] , DM5 is to finish all internal work (i.e., state and balance changes) and then call the external payment function. For example, for CB3 in Fig. 4 , if registered = true at line 14 is moved before the external call regstUser.value() at line 13, then the reentrancy attack can be avoided owing to the failure of the check require(!registered) at line 11. FPs of Unexpected Revert. Though SLITHER and SMARTCHECK can detect some cases, their rules currently are so general that most reported cases are actually bad coding practices (e.g., warnings hinted by the IDE), not exploitable vulnerabilities. Specifically, SLITHER reports 666 cases of Call in Loop, as long as an external call (e.g., send() or transfer() of other addresses) is inside a loop, regardless of its actual impact. For instance, in Fig. 7 , CB6 reported by SLITHER does not cause expected revert, as require is not used to check the return value of function send() at line 7. Similarly, SMARTCHECK supports the detection of Transfer in Loop. As SMARTCHECK checks only transfer() in a loop, it reports a much smaller number (274) than that of SLITHER (666). However, after manual auditing, we find that most reports of SLITHER are FPs due to inconsideration of the key require check that causes reverting. Hence, we summarize the DM6 -no use of require for transfer in loop to avoid DoS.
According to our observation and the recent technical article [4] , the rules of Call/Transaction in Loop are neither sound nor complete to cover most of the unexpected revert cases. At least, modifier require is ignored in these two rules, which makes SLITHER and SMARTCHECK incapable to check possible revert operations on multiple account addresses. Here, multiple accounts must be involved for exploiting this attack -the failure on one account blocks other accounts via reverting the operations for the whole loop. Hence, CB7 reported by SMARTCHECK in Fig. 8 is an FP -DM7. the operations in the loop are all on the same account (i.e., sender at line 5) and potential revert will not affect other accounts. In addition to reverting inside a loop, as shown in Fig. 3 , there exist a few other cases where reverting indeed happens in any unsecured external call without loop. FPs of Tx.Origin Abusing. For this, SLITHER reports 34 results, none of which are FPs. SLITHER's rule is simple but effective (see Rule 4 below), finding all Tx.Origin that appears in the control flow condition. The rationale is that accessing Tx.Origin is just a bad programming practice by itself, not vulnerable. Only when used in control flow conditions, it could be manipulated for control-flow hijack.
⇒ Tx.Origin abusing (4) In contrast, SMARTCHECK reports much more cases (210) than SLITHER (34), as it is more complete in considering control flow conditions inside both functions and the modifiers outside the function (see Rule 5) . As shown in Fig. 4 , the selfdefined modifier onlyAdmin() should be imported before the function. As such a modifier is used for permission control, it also affects the control flow of the program. Figure 9 : CB8: a real FP of self-destruct abusing by SLITHER, as selfdestruct() is used under two checks at line 2,4 (DM10).
cording to the paper [44] , the rule in SMARTCHECK is called unchecked external call, which checks whether calls of the above 4 functions are inside if conditions. However, in its implementation [11] , we find that it actually checks not only calls of the 4 low-level functions, but also calls of some userdefined functions. Hence, checking extra calls of user-defined functions yields 189 FPs out of 551 results. We summarize the following DM for this type -DM9. using various forms of checking (including if, require and assert checks) strictly for the four restricted low-level-calls.. FPs of Self-destruct Abusing. In the existing scanners, only SLITHER detects the misuse of self-destruct, which is called suicidal detection. In total, SLITHER reports 46 cases of suicidal via its built-in rule -as long as function selfdestruct is used, no matter what the context is, SLITHER will report it. Obviously, the SLITHER's rule is too simple and too general. It mainly works for directly calling selfdestruct without any permission control or conditions of business logic -under such circumstance (11 out of 46), the SLITHER rule can help to detect the abusing. In practice, in most cases (35 out of 46) selfdestruct is called with the admin or owner permission control or under some strict conditions in business logic. For example, selfdestruct is indeed required in the business logic of the CB8 in Fig. 9 , as the owner wants to reset the contract via calling selfdestruct after the transactions in a period are all done and the contract is not active (i.e., the condition at line 2). Note that parameter burn is just padded to call selfdestruct in a correct way. Hence, we summarize the DM10, adding a strict condition control or a self-defined modifier for identity check when using selfdestruct. The precisions of these exiting scanners on 76,354 are shown in Table 10 in Appendix. More details can be found at the website of the benchmark. As we audit the FPs and understand the rules of the existing scanners, we show the rules of existing scanners in Table 12 in Appendix. In Table 1 , we show the summarized RDRs with the corresponding DMs. In brief, for a vulnerability type, we choose the rule of the tool, which yields a better recall, and combine this rule with the corresponding DMs. For example, for reentrancy, we find the rule of SLITHER yields a better recall, the RDR is based on the SLITHER's rule and then integrated with DM1 to DM5.
Learning and Applying AVS
In this section, we explain how to learn and apply AVS to discover more similar vulnerabilities with small or big gaps. 
Learning AVS
We take three steps to extract the AVS from the vulnerable CBs: 1) preprocessing the ASTs of the input CBs to mitigate the noise due to differences in names of variables and constant values; 2) clustering the similar CBs via hierarchal clustering on the basis of tree-edit distance, 3) for each cluster of CBs, applying an efficient code differencing algorithm for the commonality and variability analysis among the CBs, on which AVS is extracted. Overall, the inputs of AVS-learning are the vulnerable CBs, and it yields as the output the learned AVS in the form of normalized ASTs. Preprocessing. To consider both semantic and structural information of the vulnerable code, we construct the AST and normalize the concrete data values in the AST nodes. The AST parsing is conducted via the open-source tool, ANTLRbased Solidity parser [9] . Proper preprocessing is applied to the AST for retaining core information and abstracting away unimportant differences (e.g., variable names or constant values) for the subsequent clustering step. We split the whole AST into segments at the unit of function. For each segment of AST that corresponds to a function, we just retain the information of node type, name, parameters and return value (if contained); while other information (e.g., range, visibility, stateMutability) will be discarded. For the variable names (e.g., _indexs in Fig. 10b and _idxs in Fig. 10c ), they will be normalized with the token asterisk " * ". Similarly, we repeat the same normalization for constant values of the types string, int, bytes or uint. Thus, we retain the core information and abstract away concrete names or values, making the clustering step sensitive to code gaps or patterns of function calls. Clustering Vulnerable Samples. After preprocessing, a set of normalized AST segments corresponding to functions serve as the input for clustering. The basic idea is to perform hierarchal clustering according to the tree-edit distance between two ASTs [19] . In this paper, we apply a robust algorithm for the tree edit-distance (ARTED) [40] , which computes the optimal path strategy by performing an exhaustive search in the space of all possible path strategies. Here, path strategy refers to a mapping between two paths of the two input trees (or subtrees), as the distance between two (sub)trees is the minimum distance of four smaller problems. Though ARTED runs in quadratic time and space complexity, it is guaranteed to perform as good or better than its competitors [40] . In Table 2 , the pair-wise tree edit distances among the four CBs are listed after applying ARTED on their normalized ASTs. As shown, the distances between the CBs in Fig. 10 are smallindicating the three CBs are very similar. With the completelinkage clustering [18] , the dendrogram of clustering results is shown in Fig.11 . If we choose the height as 50 (intuitively, about the gaps of 5 statements), we can rightly group CB9, CB10 and CB11 into one cluster and C3 alone in another.
AVS Extraction. After we cluster the similar vulnerabilities together, we need to summarize the commonality and variability among them for automated extraction of the AVS that represents their generic form. Towards this goal, we apply the open-source code differencing tool, MCIDIFF [30] , which can detect differences across multiple instances of code clones in linear comparison times. The idea is inspired from the concept of progressive alignment [21] that proves to be quite effective in multiple DNA sequence alignment. Rather than have a pair-wise comparison of time complexity O(n 2 ), MCIDIFF compares n similar CBs in n − 1 times. Details of MCIDIFF are omitted due to page limit, interested readers can refer to [30] . For the CBs in Fig. 10 , it first compares two samples (CB9 and CB11) with the least tree-edit distance, then gradually compares with others (CB10), and finally automatically gets the AVS in Fig. 18 (see Appendix) . Besides, the AVS to match CB1 and CB2 in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 12 . 
AVS-based Vulnerability Matching
The matching method is expected to be robust, succeeding in pairing up CB1 with CB2 in Fig.3 , CB9, CB10 and CB11 together in Fig. 10 , regardless the size of gaps. Besides, the algorithm should also consider the execution order of the statements, since some vulnerabilities (e.g., reentrancy) are strongly dependent on the statement execution order. Under such circumstance, our AVS-based code matching approach is on the basis of CFG rather than AST that ignores the control flow of a program. The matching process includes the following two steps: 1) generating and preprocessing the CFG from the AST of AVS; 2) applying our code matching algorithm based on the longest common sequence (LCS) [32] and sequence inclusion check. The input of AVS-based matching includes the AST of the AVS and the contracts to be scanned; the output are detected vulnerabilities in the contracts.
Generating and Preprocessing CFG
To match CB1 with CB2, in Fig. 12 , we show the AVS in the form of an AST that has been normalized. As the AVS should be compact and represent the core part of the relevant similar CBs, under the help of human expertise, the final form Figure 12 : The exemplar AVS for CB1 in Fig. 3a in the form of a normalized AST segment.
of AST owns just three statements (statement 6,7,8 in Fig. 3a ) and has variable names and values normalized (in gray background color in Fig. 12 ). Then, the AST can be used for CFG generation. The conversion process from AST to CFG is inspired by SLITHER, following the implementation routine in SLITHERIR [20] . In Fig. 17 (see Appendix), we show the CFG that is converted from the AST form of the AVS in Fig.  12 and also contains the IR inside each node of the CFG. Before matching, the standard CFG requires to be preprocessed in two steps of normalization. First, the differences in variable names and constant values need to be abstracted away as we do that for AST. For the CFG of the AVS, this step is always done in the process of learning the AVS. However, for the CFGs of the code to be scanned, the step is done in the traversal of IR instructions inside the CFG. For example, no matter currentLeader in Fig. 3a or bettor in Fig. 3b will be normalized with the placeholder *DEST*; similarly, highestBid and win will be replaced with the placeholder *VALUE*. Second, the CFG will be normalized and flattened in order to remove all the loops inside, as the following code matching algorithm works on the IR sequence in the CFG nodes. Hence, to remove loops, we remove the transition from the last node back to the beginning node of the loop. Then, to flatten the CFG, we apply the Breadth-First-Search (BFS) algorithm.
Applying the Code Matching Algorithm on CFG
Algo. 1 shows the work flow of AVS-based matching, which takes as input the two sequences (the signature S 1 and the target S 2 ) and the predefined similarity threshold η, and finally yields a boolean value b m indicating the result. Basically, Algo. 1 takes two steps: matching based on LCS at line 12 or on subsequence inclusion check at line 14. First, if with a similar length, the two sequences can be directly matched by LCS algorithm at line 1-2; if the target is much larger than the signature, the LCS with sliding window will be employed at line 3-10. Last, if not matched by LCS, the sequence inclusion check will be applied -function isIncludedByOrder checks whether every node in S 1 appears and follows the same order as that in S 2 . As the workflow of Algo. 1 has the time complexity O(n) and LCS is O(nlog 2 n) in our implementation, the overall time complexity is O(n 2 log 2 n).
Algorithm 1: Code Matching based on CFG IR nodes
input :S 1 , the signature sequence of the AVS input :S 2 , the target sequence of code to be scanned input :η, the threshold of the similarity% be matched output :b m , the boolean result of matching This algorithm can effectively match the CB pairs in Fig. 3 or Fig. 10 , using any one in the pair as the signature and the other as the target. For the CBs with a small gap in Fig. 10 , as they have the close length, the LCS can directly match them with a code similarity of 75%. For the pair with big gaps in Fig. 3 , the method LCS() at line 7 actually fails. In contrast, our algorithm successes owing to isIncludedByOrder() at line 14 -the CFG IR sequence of AVS for CB1 in Fig. 12 appears with the exactly same order as that in the flattened IR sequence of the CFG of CB2. Thus, with the proper AVS, the code matching approach can also effectively mitigate the big gaps.
Besides the bool result b m , our approach can specify the possible position of a vulnerability as finer-grained as statement level, accord to the part of S 2 that is matched with S 1 .
Evaluation
Experimental Environment. Throughout the evaluation, all the steps are conducted on a machine running on Ubuntu 18.04, with 8 core 2.10GHz Intel Xeon E5-2620V4 processor, 32 GB RAM, and 4 TB HDD. For the scanners used in evaluation, no multithreading options are available and only the by-default setting is used for them. Dataset for Benchmark Construction. We implement a web crawler to download Solidity files from accounts of Etherscan [1] , a famous third-party website on Ethereum block explorer. When we started crawling, public users are allowed to freely download Solidity files. However, since the beginning of 2019, only 1000 accounts of recently verified contracts can be accessed on Etherscan per day. Finally, we crawl from 18714 accounts and get 76,354 contracts. The crawler adopts a random search strategy on the webpages of Etherscan to assure the randomness of downloaded contracts. Dataset for Tool Evaluation. As we observe the DMs and rules of existing tools on the 76,354 contracts, it will be unfair to evaluate the resulted tool (the finally learned AVS and the summarized RDRs) on that dataset. Hence, we get another address list of contracts from Google BigQuery Open Dataset. After removing the addresses that are already in those of the 76,354 contracts, we get the other 17,770 real-world contracts deployed on Ethereum, on which we fairly compare our resulted tool DOUBLADE with the latest version of the scanners: SLITHER v0.6.4. OYENTE v0.2.7, SMARTCHECK v2.0 and SECURIFY v1.0 that is open-sourced at Dec 2018. Research Questions (RQs). With three state-of-the-art scanners and two collected datasets, we aim to answer these RQs: RQ1. What is the quality of the constructed benchmark? Are the AVS representative and are vulnerabilities valid? RQ2. How is the accuracy of our resulted tool, compared with the existing scanners in detecting vulnerability? RQ3. How is the efficiency of our resulted tool, in building vulnerability benchmark and also in tool comparison?
RQ1: Evaluating the AVS and the Resulted Vulnerability Benchmark
During the process of applying our approach (AVS and RDRs) to detect vulnerability, the important intermediate results include the totally learned AVS. Besides, on the 76,354 contracts, the final results include the union of TPs reported by all tools, which constitutes the vulnerability benchmark.
Collecting Representative AVS. Based on the TPs reported by the existing scanners, we automatically extract the AVS.
In Table 3 , we show the number of the extracted AVS for each vulnerability type. Totally, from the existing TPs we learn 42 AVS, 47.6% of which are of reentrancy -indicating the various forms of reentrancy vulnerability. For example, for the 96 TPs of reentrancy found by SLITHER and OYENTE, we apply the AST tree-edit distance based clustering method and get 24 clusters (when setting the cluster width to 100 edits). After manual inspection, we find 20 clusters are representative and can serve as the AVS for discovering more unknown ones. For example, for some functions (e.g., buyFirstTokens, sellOnApprove, sendEthProportion and so on), we find their cloned instances of an extent of similarity due to the copy-paste-modify paradigm. For these cloned instances, we apply the code differencing to extract the AVS and further refine the AVS to retain the core parts via manual inspection. For unexpected revert, we also find there exist some cloned instances between TPs. Especially, for the two typical scenario of unexpected revert -the revert on single account (see Fig. 3 ) and the revert due to failed operations on multiple accounts via a loop, we get totally 8 AVS via clustering more than 200 TPs that are reported by SLITHER or OYENTE.
For three other vulnerability types, we cannot get clusters of cloned function instances due to the fact that the triggering of vulnerability requires not much context. As the remaining types are all about improper checks, we design 4 or 5 AVS for each type. For example, regarding Tx.origin abusing, the existing scanners mainly check whether it is inside if statement. We extend this with more AVS, such as checking Tx.origin inside require, assert and if-throw. Last, for unchecked lowlevel-call, 4 AVS are used to catch the improper low-level calls in loop without any validation check on return values, for call(), callcode(), delegatecall() and send(). Unionizing TPs of Various Tools. To identify the TPs of existing tools, some manual effort is inevitable. Still, we adopt some strategy to speed up the manual auditing process meanwhile achieving the accuracy of auditing. For example, if a vulnerability is reported by two or more tools among SLITHER, OYENTE, SMARTCHECK and SECURIFY, one researcher will manually check whether it is a TP. Otherwise if it is reported by only one tool, two researchers will check this, and the third researcher will be involved if they give different manual auditing results. After gathering and unionizing the TPs of all tools, we could build up the benchmark that is of high confidence. As shown in Fig. 13 , the vulnerability benchmark consists of totally 1,219 vulnerability instances. Reentrancy and unchecked low-level-call still constitute a considerable part, while Tx.Origin abusing and self destruct are much fewer than what we expected. Finally, we publish all the 1,219 TPs of five vulnerability types on the benchmark website [6] . Dynamic Confirmation of TPs. To confirm the validity of detected TPs of vulnerabilities, we further sample some of the instances and manage to trigger the vulnerability on our local server. Specifically, for vulnerabilities found by each AVS in Table 3 , we randomly pick up two samples from them. For each selected sample, we identify all the contracts it depends on and copy them into the local testing project on our local server. The reason that we just choose two samples of each AVS for confirmation is twofold: 1). The vulnerabilities matched by the same AVS will be similar and could be triggered in similar ways; 2). Triggering a concrete vulnerability requires the customization of the attack code, which is currently manually done via human expert (see attack code in [6] ). Notably, automated attack code customization for vulnerability triggering will be out of the scope of this study. 
RQ2: Evaluating the Resulted Tool
As mentioned in §4.2 and §6.1, we have learned 42 AVS and 10 DMs in total for the five types of vulnerabilities. To evaluate the effectiveness of the resulted AVS and DM-based RDRs, we apply them on the 17,770 newly collected contracts and compare with the latest version of existing tools. Details on the accuracy of each tool for every type are shown in Table 4 . We identify the TPs of each tool via manual auditing, as the detection number for each tool is still acceptable.
Reasons for Low FPs of of DOUBLADE
In Table 4 , we list 313 detection results of DOUBLADE, with an overall precision of 48.2%, regardless of vulnerability types. In comparison, SLITHER has a total precision of 20.1%; OYENTE's total precision is 14.3%; SMARTCHECK's total precision is 37.3%; and SECURIFY's total precision is surprisingly only 4.3%. We analyze the FP rates of these tools from the perspective of supporting DMs mentioned in §4. 
Discussion
The Necessity of Manual Effort. The efforts in our approach mainly lie in the investigation of the existing scanners used in our study ( §4.2). Towards a high-quality vulnerability benchmark, identifying the TPs from results of existing tools is a inevitable task. Although two or more tools may agree on some cases, the manual audit is still required to confirm that. AVS could be learned automatically ( §5.1), but the DM summarization must rely on human expertise. Last, with the final AVS and RDRs, the experiments in §6.2 need human expert to count the TPs and calculate the precision and recall. For ease of public review, we publish the vulnerability dataset and tool comparison results in the website [6] .
Related Work
Vulnerability Detection in Smart Contracts. As listed in Table 8 in Appendix, there are mainly 13 security scanners on smart contracts. From the perspective of software analysis, these scanners could be categorized into static-or dynamicbased. In the former category, SLITHER [47] aims to be the analysis framework that runs a suite of vulnerability detectors. OYENTE [31, 33] analyzes the bytecode of the contracts and applies Z3-solver [17] to conduct symbolic executions. Recently, SMARTCHECK [11, 44] translates Solidity source code into an XML-based IR and defines the XPath-based patterns to find code issues. SECURIFY [10, 48] , a tool that can work on the EVM code, is proposed to detect the vulnerability via compliance (or violation) patterns to guarantee that certain behaviors are safe (or unsafe, respectively). These static tools usually adopt symbolic execution or verification techniques, being relevant to DOUBLADE. However, none of them applies code-similarity based matching technique or takes into account the possible DMs in code to prevent from attacks. There are some other tools that enable the static analysis for smart contracts. ZEUS [25] adopts XACML as a language to write the safety and fairness properties, converts them into LLVM IR [2] and then feeds them to a verification engine such as SEAHORN [23] . Besides, there is another EVM bytecode decompiling and analysis frame, namely OCTOPUS [3], which needs the users to define the patterns for vulnerability detections. To prevent the DAO, Grossman et al. propose the notion of effectively Callback Free (ECF) objects in order to allow callbacks without preventing modular reasoning [22] . MAIAN is presented to detect greedy, prodigal, and suicidal contracts [37] , and hence the vulnerabilities to address differ from the types we address in this paper. The above tools are relevant, but due to various reasons (issues in tool availability or supported types), we cannot have a direct comparison between DOUBLADE and them.
The less relevant category includes dynamic testing or fuzzing tools: MANTICORE [46] , MYTHRIL [13] , MYTHX [14] , ECHIDNA [45] and ETHRACER [28] . MYTHRIL and MYTHX use the advanced techniques (e.g., concolic testing and tainting) for detection. In addition, researchers also propose the testing-based tool MANTICORE and the fuzzing library ECHIDNA or tool ETHRACER. Dynamic tools often target certain vulnerability types and produce results with a low FP rate. However, they are unsuitable for a large-scale detection due to the efficiency issue. Code-similarity based Vulnerability Detection. In general, similar-code matching technique is widely adopted for vulnerability detection. In 2016, VULPECKER [29] is proposed to apply different code-similarity algorithms in various purposes for different vulnerability types. It leverages vulnerability signatures from National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [38] and applies them to detect 40 vulnerabilities that are not published in NVD, among which 18 are zero-days. As VULPECKER works on the source code of C, BINGO [12] can execute on binary code and compare the assembly code via tracelet (partial trace of CFG) extraction [16] and similarity measuring. Recently, VUDDY [27] represents the state-of-the-art on construction of vulnerability benchmark of C. To sum up, these studies usually resort to the vulnerability database of C language for discovering similar zero-days. In contrast, plenty of our efforts are exhausted in gathering vulnerabilities from other tools for smart contracts and auditing them manually. Besides, VUDDY [27] targets at exact clones and parameterized clones, not gapped clones, as it utilizes hashing for matching for the purpose of high efficiency. DOUBLADE adopts a more robust algorithm, which can tolerate big or small code gaps across the similar candidates of a vulnerability.
Conclusion
So far, a few works have exposed various vulnerabilities in smart contracts [5, 7, 34] and plenty of scanners have been presented to detect the security issues. Yet, to the best knowledge of ours, there is no study on building a vulnerability benchmark for smart contracts. In this paper, we apply three state-of-the-art scanners, learn the AVS from the TPs of their results, and summarize the DM-based RDRs from FPs of their results. Then, we combine the AVS and the DM-based RDRs in our tool, namely DOUBLADE, for achieving both precision and recall in building vulnerability benchmark and detecting unknown vulnerabilities. In future, we will support more vulnerability types and integrate with verification techniques. Figure 16 : The attack that can exploit the vulnerability of CB2 in Fig. 3b . Attackers call revert() in the fallback function. Once highestBidder.transfer(fundsByBidder[highestBidder]) in victim contract is executed, the fallback function will be triggered and the revert will happen. Figure 19 : The attack that can exploit the vulnerability of CB12 in Fig. 14. The vulnerable function in CB12 has no DM of access control (e.g. modifiers). The attacker can set the victim address by setVictim function. Once the attacker runs aliceClaimsPayment in CB12 and passes the address of the attack contract as an argument _addr, the control flow goes to line 10, then the transfer function in attacker's code is called. Hence, a function call loop is formed. The code of line 8 and 9 in CB12 could be reentranted several times but can not send any ethers. After 5 times of reentrant, the attacker changes the argument _addr to 0x0, then the control flow goes to line 7 in CB12 and ethers are sent to the attacker. 
